Abstract: Soft error is nowadays a serious problem when implementing AES SBOX algorithms in hardware. The objective of the study is to detect the error using parity bit for the AES SBOX and implementation in hardware with low area and power. This circuit can products the AES Encryption/Decryption process and systems against fault based attacks. It can also apply to any digital communication systems and security related applications.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic algorithms play a crucial role in the information society. When we use teller machines, home banking services or credit cards, call someone on a mobile phone, get access to health care services, or buy something on the web, cryptographic algorithms are used to offer protection. These algorithms guarantee that nobody can steal our money, place a call at our expense, eavesdrop on our phone calls, or get unauthorized access to sensitive health data. Information technology keeps changing and will become increasingly pervasive, while disappearing from the eye of the user. However, this evolution keeps presenting new security challenges and there is no doubt that cryptographic algorithms and protocols will form an important part of the solution (Bertoni et al., 2003) .
Fault detection: Fault detection and tolerance schemes for various implementations of cryptographic algorithm have recently been considered. Several motivations led to increase the reliability of these circuits. From one side the circuit implementation of cryptographic algorithms can be quite complex, increasing the probability of device failures. Fault detection is therefore helpful in finding faults during the production tests. In addition, fault tolerance schemes are very useful to on-line tolerate faults during mission time. From the other side, intentional intrusions and attacks based on the malicious injection of transient faults into the device are very efficient in order to extract the secret key (Boneh et al., 2001; Bertoni et al., 2003) .
Fault based attacks:
Side channel attacks-power analysis attacks: Attacks based on fault injection are not the only way to gain access to sensitive information. In the last few years, new techniques for attacking implementations of cryptographic algorithms have been studied and developed. Unlike direct attacks on the algorithm, these techniques, called Side Channel Attacks, attempt to gather knowledge of sensitive data that may leak from a particular implementation of the cryptographic algorithm. One of the most successful side-channel attack exploits (Regazzoni et al., 2007; Brier et al., 2004) the correlation between the power consumption of a given device and the data being processed. These Power Analysis Attacks have particular relevance since for some of them; no knowledge regarding the implementation of the target device is needed in order to be effective. Several solutions have already been proposed and implemented, at different levels, to counteract these unconventional forms of attacks. However, almost all the proposed countermeasures so far have targeted a single type of side-channel attack and only very few studies have addressed the effects that one specific countermeasure can have on the resistance to a different type of attack (Kocher et al., 1999) .
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (2001) is a block cipher adopted as an encryption standard by the U.S. government. AES began immediately to replace the Data Encryption Standard (DES), which had been in use since 1976. AES outperforms DES in improved long-term security because of larger key sizes (128, 192 and 256 bits, respectively) . Another major advantage of AES is the possibility of efficient implementation on various platforms. AES is suitable for small 8-bit microprocessor platforms and common 32-bit processors and it is appropriate for dedicated hardware implementations. Hardware implementations can reach throughput rates in the gigabit range.
A number of hardware implementations for the AES SBox circuit have been proposed (Zhang and Parhi, 2002) because AES Sbox was most expensive part of the circuit in terms of area. Next Section will describe in detail the algorithm of the AES and in particular the definition and the characteristics of the SBox. In this study, we focus on to detect the error using parity bit for the AES SBox.
The AES SBox performs nonlinear operation and variant with parity. The parity bit is not wellmaintained after the transformation. This is the reason for developed to predict the value of the output parity bit starting from the input bit.
In this study, we focus on the design and implementation of low power AES SBox with error detection circuit Compared to previous works, our solution has produced low area and power.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Advanced encryption standard:
The Rijindael algorithm (Daemen and Rijmen, 1999) each row of the State contains N b = 4 bytes. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on key length equal to 128 bits. The four bytes in each column of the State array form a 32-bit word, with the row number as the index for the four bytes in each word. At the beginning of encryption or decryption, the array of input bytes is mapped to the State array as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The 128-bit block can be expressed as 16 bytes: in0, in1, in 2, … in 15. Encryption and decryption processes are performed on the State, at the end of which the final value is mapped to the output bytes array out0, out1, out 2, … out15.
The AES algorithm is an iterative algorithm. Each iteration is called a round. The total number of rounds is 10. At the start of encryption, input is copied to the State array. After the initial round key addition, 10 rounds of encryption are performed. The first 9 rounds are the same, with small differences in the final round. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , each of the first 9 rounds consists of 4 transformations: Sub Bytes, Shift Rows, Mix Columns and Add Round Key. The final round excludes the Mix Columns transformation. The encryption structure in Fig. 2 can be inverted to get a straightforward structure for decryption.
Sub bytes transformation:
The Substitution-Box (Sbox) is a basic component of symmetric key algorithms and should always be carefully chosen to create strong confusion and to resist certain kinds of cryptanalysis. The multiplicative inversion maps over Galois Field are frequently employed due to their ideal cryptographic characteristic.
This SBox is constructed by composing two transformations:
• Take the multiplicative inverse in the finite field GF (2 8 ) The element (00000000) 2 is mapped to itself • Apply the following affine transformation (over GF (2)):
For 0≤i<8, where bi is the i th bit of the byte and C i is the i th bit of a byte c whose value is fixed and is equal to {01100011}.
This transformation can be pre-calculated for each possible input value since it works on a single byte, therefore there are only 256 values.
Shift rows transformation:
In this transformation, the bytes in the first row of the State do not change. The second, third and fourth rows shift cyclically to the left 1, 2 and 3 bytes, respectively. 
Mix columns transformation:
Key expansion:
The key expansion routine, as part of the overall AES algorithm, takes the input key of 128 bits. The output is an expanded key of 11*128 bits, i.e., the expanded key is composed of the secret key and 10 round keys, one for each round.
Error detection circuit's overview: The AES (Rijndael) algorithm (Daemen and Rijmen, 1999) implements a block cipher for symmetric key cryptography. The block size is 128 bits, while the key size is 128, 192 or 256 bits, respectively. During the encryption process, four different transformations are iterated a number of times depending on the key size. The four basic transformations are: Shift Rows, Sub Bytes (using SBoxes), Mix Columns and finally Add Round Key. The added key is different in each round and these round keys are generated by a key schedule routine that takes the secret key and executes an expansion as specified in the standard. The same basic transformations are used during decryption, but they are applied in reverse order. For the AES S-box, we implemented four versions of the nonlinear function. The first circuit implements the nonlinear transformation as described in the standard, while in all the other three we added logic to provide error detection. In this section we summarize the solutions based on the parity bit for the SBox. The parity check we used is the one proposed in a single odd parity bit is added to every byte. An AES Sbox with an added error detection circuit (Bertoni et al., 2003) .
The error detection circuit checks the correctness of the input and the output of the S-box. When new data enters the S-box, the check bits are separated from the data bits and error detection is performed. If no error is detected, the 8 data bits enter the S-box circuit. The Sbox produces then the result of the non-linear transformation plus the corresponding check bits. At this point the second check is performed, again as described before. If no error is detected in both checks, the output of the S-box can be forwarded to the next round transformation, otherwise, a faulty output composed of all zeros except the rightmost bit is generated to signal the error.
Implementation of AES s-box error detection circuit:
The SBox was implemented using 256*8 bit A solution to generate the outgoing parity bits is proposed in and sketched in Fig. 3a : an odd parity bit is either stored with each data byte in the SBox (memory implementation), or on-line generated by an ad-hoc combinational circuit (in the case of combinational logic implementation for the SBox). This solution is not very expensive and it guarantees acceptable fault coverage.
To increase the dependability and to detect additional input parity errors and some internal memory errors (data or decode), proposes replacing the original 8-bit decoder with a 9-bit one, yielding a 256×9 bit memory (Fig. 3b) . If a 9-bit address with an even parity is decoded, the corresponding output byte with its associated even parity bit is produced. Otherwise, a constant word of 9 bits with a deliberately odd parity is output, e.g., "000000001". Thus, half of the entries in the SBox memory will be deliberately wrong (in the figure, all the rows marked with a '*'). In case of a single error in the input value, a wrong cell will be addressed. That cell will contain an erroneous parity bit that will be detected during the parity bit check. This solution guarantees higher fault coverage, but it's very expensive in terms of used area.
Proposed solution implementation of AES s-box error detection circuit:
In this study, we focus on the use of the parity code for a single SBox. We propose a solution that is suitable for all the schemes where there is a parity check for each byte element of the matrix S. The main problem in implementing the parity bit for the SBox is related to the fact that the SBox transformation is not invariant with respect to the parity bit. Hence, it is necessary to implement a method to predict the output parity, given the input value.
In order to meet higher fault detection capability a code based fault detection approach has been adopted, consisting of information redundancy applied to both data and address of the memory storing the SBox values. With this solution we are able to target Address Faults as well. An Address Faults typically cause that during a read operation an unexpected cell is accessed by a given address. The use of detection codes based on both the address and the data allows the detection of Address Faults. One characteristic of the SBox is that it implements an invertible function. This feature allows calculating the input value starting from the output response. Therefore, it is possible to predict the parity bit of the input word starting from the output response of the SBox (without implementing the inverse function, see below for details). The main idea is that we do not add any parity bit in the memory that stores the SBox values (or into the combinational logic that implements it). On the contrary, we calculate the parity of the input value and we compare it with the parity bit predicted starting from the output value of the SBox. In addition, we calculate the parity bit of the output of the SBox and we compare it with the prediction of this bit starting from the input value. All works presented in the past were based on the predictor of the output parity (Fig. 4) .
We calculated the Output Parity Checker and the Input Parity Checker using the truth tables of the SBox and of the parity bits, calculated for both the input value and the output value. Table 1 shows the first elements of the truth tables. This scheme allows double protection of the SBox circuit and it should allow covering more faults than the architectures proposed in the literature.
This result is important when considering protecting circuits from side channel attacks the parity bit must be secured as well as the other bits.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Experimental results: In this section we provide some result related to the area of the proposed approach (Karri et al., 2003) . Analytical comparisons of the selected previous works are as summarized in Table 2 .
The Proposed AES SBOX circuits have been developed in VHDL Language. It was simulated and synthesized on the Xilinx FPGA device VERTEX 2 XC2V80 as depicted in Fig. 4 . At the different proposed AES SBOX results as listed below:
• Table 3 shows a Synthesis report of Normal AES SBOX.
• Table 4 shows a synthesis report of concurrent error detection AES SBOX.
• Table 5 shows a synthesis report of non-concurrent error detection AES SBOX.
The final simulation result was taken after replacement of Proposed AES SBOX using AES Algorithm. It was verified using MODELSIM XE III6.1E as depicted in Fig. 5 .
The above said both proposed architectures have been performed in a minimized area and power.
Synthesis report of normal AES SBOX using XILINXISE 9.2I is shown in Table 3 .
Synthesis report of concurrent error detection AES SBOX using XILINXISE 9.2I is shown in Table 4 . Synthesis report of non concurrent error detection AES SBOX using XILINXISE 9.2I is shown in Table 5 .
Advanced encryption standard result using modelsim XE III6.1E is shown in Fig. 5 .
CONCLUSION
In this study, the processor is designed using VHDL description language, the simulation is done using Modelsim XE III 6.1e and the design was synthesized on the Xilinx FPGA device VERTEX 2 XC2V80. The simulation results show that the processor provides a very good performance. Its Utilize a maximum 5% of area compare to the Normal AES SBOX area to a maximum of 21%.
The proposed future works to develop the circuit for error detection using sub pipeline architecture.
